COIN is hard

There were several items in the news recently that drive it home for the umpteenth time: Counterinsurgency really isn’t easy. Let me count the ways.

First, we should remember that the United States actually has a history of successful counterinsurgency efforts. The US fought and won several counterinsurgencies here, here, and maybe it's slightly politically incorrect, but here as well. We even have a brand new COIN manual, authored in part by General Petraeus, though this isn’t the first time a manual has been written.

Lately, the Pentagon has been purchasing lots of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. This is quite an evolution from the first jeep that the US used at the dawn of mechanized warfare. MRAPs can resist what the insurgents used to throw at the unarmored, then up-armored hummves. But if you build a bigger truck, then of course insurgents build a bigger bomb. And there's an upward limit to the size of a truck, but not for bombs. The top-heavy MRAPs are prone to flipping when off-roading. And the Pentagon is in the market for more…

Counterinsurgency 101 tells us to live among the population and off the FOBs. And Machiavelli warns against living in fortresses for the same reason: you are forced to interact more with the people, and you will urgently find political solutions when your own security is tied to that of the population’s security. However, if you're advocating driving around in a stripped-down Wrangler, rather than an MRAP, that’s a tough thing to do right now in Afghanistan.

A couple of years ago the Pentagon started a program to send trained social scientists into Iraq and Afghanistan to assist in understanding the local populations better. Some of the very first results were striking successes. But even this effort isn’t too easy either. Bottom line: COIN is hard. Let’s hope the new administration is ready for the challenges ahead.