The Great Game revisited

The Great Game is a term used to describe the 19th century struggles between the British and Russian Empires for supremacy in Central Asia. It’s henceforth been a term that also tends to get thrown around anytime Russia butts heads with a Western power over territory in Central Asia. It happens to be a great day to revisit the Great Game.

Last week, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced in Moscow that Kyrgyzstan will discontinue U.S. access to an air base that is key to military operations in Afghanistan. Why did he make this announcement from Russia? Well, because he had just finished a meeting where Russian President Medvedev pledged to lend Kyrgyzstan $2 billion, write off $180 million in debt, and add another $150 million in aid.

Where to begin? No one wins the Great Game. The base in Kyrgyzstan is currently the only good US access point to Afghanistan, as the Uzbekistani government stopped allowing US operations back in 2005. This will drastically affect the war on terrorism right as the Obama administration was preparing to deploy as many as 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan this week. Oops.

Moreover, the Kyrgyz sanctioned US use of the base was really the last show of any good relations between the Kyrgyz Republic and the US. Since Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution in 2005, freedom and human rights have not taken off as the West would have hoped. The country is increasingly turning to its closer neighbor - Russia - for support. Now with this large fiscal promise from Medvedev, the Central Asian country is sure to back slide even further away from the goals of the color revolutions.

Sounds bad? It gets worse. Russia is angling for leverage in running the war on terrorism on its own terms, but she is in no position to make these promises of loans and aid. If history is any indication, Russia is now setting a precedent. It cannot follow through on similar promises to the other Central Asian nations, but will certainly have to go through the motions. Unless the economy hits a dramatic up-turn, Russia is setting itself up to fail.

And the big loser in the Great Game? Well, that continues to be the people of Central Asia. Human rights, independent media, and basic freedoms will continue to decline. The initial capital from Russia will most likely boost a number of government programs, but nothing will be sustained. My advice? We’re all better off playing Risk.

(Photo via markusbc)

South Asia double down

I've been slow to write about the events in India for a variety of reasons, but now that (some of) the dust has settled, it seems appropriate to offer a few thoughts. India (especially Mumbai) is a country I love and have spent a lot of time in and I am loathe to think that the US is dragging its feet in response. 

In the midst of condemnations and travel plans, people seem to be forgetting that these are two nuclear powers in a strategically critical part of the world. What the US does is vital to the future security and stability of South Asia. Though their methods may not have been perfect, our present administration has done a wonderful job of simultaneously maintaining good (well, decent) relations with Pakistan and India.  India is, and should be, one of our strongest allies, even if we have to offer some concessions (non-prolifi what?) and Pakistan continues to be vital to our efforts in Afghanistan. The danger of wrong, or even worse - no, action in this scenario may hasten the loss of two of our most important allies.

The US needs to stamp out any speculation that the ISI (Pakistan's intelligence agency) was involved: even if they were, the notion will simply weaken Pakistan's young, struggling civilian government. The simple truth is that we can't afford to lose support from either of these countries and that will require the type of diplomatic nuance the Bush administration widely lacks. Secretary Rice must send a strong message that any military movement or action will be closely watched, roundly condemned, and will result in lost concessions, whether in trade, arms, or technology. Cooperative investigation is the best, and hardest, path to restoring some semblance of normality.

Take notice W: we can't wait until January 20th for any type of resolution. US memory is short and a deft handling of this situation may alleviate much of the disdain the foreign policy community holds for you.

(Photo: EC)

Raid Syria? Sure, why not?

This past summer I backpacked through much of Syria, and the guys at Zeitgeist have asked me to share a few thoughts on the recent raid by US forces into Syria.

First, a little back ground info:

On October 26th, the United States raided a village on the outskirts of the Syrian town of Abu Kamal, which is right on the Iraq border. Four American helicopters entered Syrian airspace in the middle of the afternoon (rather bold, I’d say) and the raid resulted in the death of Abu Ghadiyain, Al-Qaeda's senior coordinator who was operating in Syria. This is the first attack of this nature by US forces into Syria, and Syria’s government was none too pleased, labeling the raid “criminal” and “terrorist aggression.”

Russia, Venezuela, France, China, Iran, North Korea, and a host of other nations condemned the attack with varying degrees of strong language. Iraqi government officials also voiced extreme displeasure with the raid- the said they didn’t sign up to have Americans invading other countries’ sovereign territory while using Iraq as their base.

I took a whirlwind road trip of eastern Syria this summer, which included a visit to the town of Abu Kamal. After sugaring up my mukhabarat (secret police) escort that had been following me as I visited archeological sites on the Euphrates, I was able to visit the border crossing, pictured below, on the condition that I didn’t take any pictures.

The Syrian border guards were pleasant, and they said at most only five or six cars cross from Syria into Iraq each day. This, however, is not the impression you get from Abu Kamal, which was bustling with the types of commerce that you would expect in a remote town that Iraqi insurgents use as a safe haven. From the plethora of desert-going American SUVs, many with Iraqi license plates (and some with Texas DMV stickers still on their windows), it was clear that more than a half dozen vehicles were crossing from Syria into Iraq near Abu Kamal.

So indeed, there are Iraqi insurgents in Syria. And some even have Osama Bin Laden bumper stickers. Abu Kamal, and the whole of eastern Syria, is a pretty wild place. In counter-insurgency lingo it could be classified as a “sanctuary.”

But what to do about it? And what are the implications from this raid? More to follow in a few minutes...

Tread carefully

Human Rights Watch reported today that civilian deaths in Afghanistan tripled from 2006 to 2007. The main culprit? US and NATO air strikes. Unfortunately this is a trend that has continued unabated in 2008. These developments are more than "regrettable" but spell serious trouble for military efforts in the region.

As strikes continue to kill more and more civilians, the US is fast losing support, not only from the Afghan and Pakistani public, but also the governments of both countries. The recent death of 90 civilians - confirmed by the UN - has led to increasingly tough rhetoric from President Karzai and the recent border crossing strikes in Pakistan are leading Zardari, soon to be President of Pakistan, to step up criticism of US and NATO efforts.

Unless the US is careful and starts heeding the very warranted criticisms of both Presidents, then we will soon find ourselves lacking allies and support in the region. Using targeted strikes instead of increasing troop levels is the right move; I've noted this before. But our forces must take great care to verify intelligence before bombing these frontier areas. Any semblance of success hinges on cooperation and support from the independent tribes that inhabit the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This vital section of the populace will not stand for many more civilian deaths...nor should they. As politicians continue to gather support by distancing themselves from American efforts, this administration must realize that our focus should be winning the hearts and minds of the populace. Small, focused special forces groups are the right approach to purging this area of radicalism. While air strikes by drones may decrease the risk to our troops they lack the capability to define civilians and assess information gathered on the ground. Increased intelligence will win this war but don't expect civilians to offer much help if we keep killing their families.

(AP Photo)

Hot potato

I know I'm not the only one dismayed by the lack of coverage Iraq has been given in the media and the presidential campaign. With rising inflation, unemployment, and a seemingly never ending fall in the housing market, it is no surprise that the economy has become issue #1 in this race. These are real and legitimate domestic problems, and Afghanistan may pose a bigger threat to the overall security of the US, but let's not forget the US government spends $720 million a day in Iraq. The war should be a central concern of our national consciousness and it's not. When news that the US will hand over security in Anbar to Iraqi forces is on page 14 of the NY Times and barely mentioned throughout the blogosphere, it is obvious how far our foray into Iraq has slipped from the political dialogue.

But, whenever politicians do talk about Iraq some sort of unspoken consensus emerges. With a timetable agreed to by pretty much everyone, there is no longer a real discussion of whether this is the right path for Iraq (or what will follow). With developments like this handover slowly occurring, is Iraq really a stable and peaceful democracy?

In a word, no. BUT, if the Iraqi government is reaching oil deals, maintaining security, and on the path to elections have we done our job in Iraq? That's a bit of a loaded question since we never really had a defined goal. Iraq is certainly not stable nor peaceful but is on the road there. More important than transitional takeovers and timetables is the manner our exit is executed and the legacy we leave behind.

Just keep in mind that Anbar is where the Sunni Awakening started...

Going, going, gone

Despite my obvious interest in Pakistan, I did not want to write about Musharraf's resignation until I had some time to really think about the implications. There has been plenty of commentary, most of which is missing the point.

Musharraf was an army man at heart who eschewed democracy for iron fisted control of the military and intelligence communities. His biggest accomplishment was holding onto power for this long. Just after that was his ability to hoodwink the US into believing he was the man who could lead the region into stability. 

History will wait to judge Musharraf until Pakistan's position in the geopolitical realm is resolved. If Pakistan remains stable and is able to control extremism (it will never be fully stamped out), he will be praised for his military prowess and vision in aligning Pakistan with the US. If Pakistan slides deeper into decline and becomes a lawless frontier, then he will be blamed for not doing enough and leaving the civilian government with its hands tied. The truth is that, as much as people call for the coalition to stay strong, they will continue to quibble over the problematic domestic issues that hang over the country (judges, inflation, and violence).

Matthew Yglesias almost gets it right. The US needs a Pakistan policy that is not based on a "new Musharraf" or other figurehead; but this is simply not possible. Pakistani politics, like the Indian variety, are based on cults of personality. Until Pakistani political discourse becomes rooted in policy and not people, the US has little chance of influencing the country's course. The only possibility of guiding Pakistan to a more stable economy and democracy is to divert money from the military to development schemes. If we can build private enterprise and political participation, perhaps the people of Pakistan will demand more from a better leader. Unfortunately, the rudder remains up for now.

Don't call it a comeback...

The Wall Street Journal reports today that Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Mahdi Army, plans to transform his militia into a "social services organization". The US Army and other influential Iraq policy wonks are greeting the news with cautious optimisim. Such a wait and see attitude seems understandable, but given Sadr's adherence to previous cease-fire agreements, I would prefer to see the Iraqi government fork over some of their $79 billion surplus and bring Sadr and his followers into the political process.

As I've mentioned before (and so has RAND), counter-terrorism (and by extension in Iraq, state-building) requires that citizens trust their government: this is done by strengthening civic institutions. If you're of the mindset that economic growth is more important (and I understand this logic) I would argue that foreign investment and private enterprise will not grow in Iraq until the political process yields some semblance of stability in the country. Such a double-edged sword is difficult to handle. Sadr represents an opportunity for the US to pass the buck and allows Iraqis a chance to prove the merits of their burgeoning polticial system.

Sadr is a smart man. He has weathered various changes in opinion and strategy in Iraq and managed to stay relevant. There is no doubt in my mind this is his first step into the political arena. Given his influence, and the stalled provincial elections, we should encourage such a move. While it may irk hard-liners and military types, bringing former militants into the fold is the best way to pacify a country and encourage democratic growth. There is precedent for succcess (Nepal, Northern Ireland) and we should encourage unifying elements that the surge has quieted but also fragmented. Speeches seem to unify people better than guns.

Pakistani doubletalk

I've discussed the importance and role of Pakistan in South Asia before. Now CIA officials are taking a hard line with the ISI (Pakistan's intelligence agency) regarding their involvement with militant groups. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has denied the supposed links.

The ISI ran arms to the Mujaheddin and other Afghans fighting against the Soviets. Back then it was with CIA backing, but Pakistan retains a vested interest in being seen as an ally of whatever group grabs power in Afghanistan. The new coalition government wants to see democracy thrive in Afghanistan. It would promote peace and stability within Pakistan and increase their international standing. But their porous border in the FATA region prevents any such events. The ISI could certainly, with CIA help, close this border, or at least tighten it. But there are factions of the ISI that are more than happy to assist the Taliban in their various nefarious activities, and take a nice cut off the top. In addition to this, the military men running the ISI are hedging their bets by supporting both sides of the power struggle in Afghanistan. They are stuck in an outdated mindset and hoping for an Afghan ally, regardless of who is in power, to counter the perceived threat from India.

I've said it before and I'll say it again. The stability of Afghanistan and the entire region is hinged on a working relationship between Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. The US is right to force the ISI's hand and demand a legitimate and appropriate response. But military and intelligence aspects must be tempered by transparent, civil structures. We should be encouraging, and diplomatically maneuvering for, civilian control of the ISI. Counter-terrorism requires a civilian, not military, response. We should help Pakistan in developing just that.

Talibanistan?

Pakistan is quickly becoming home to more foreign terrorists than ever before. This is not helped by the truce being cut between the government and tribal groups from the northwestern FATA region. Baitullah Mehsud, a warlord widely suspected of plotting Benazir Bhutto's assassination, is leading the charge. The deal comes fresh on the heels of a suicide bomb attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul that killed 41 civilians and injured 139.

While the US demurly denies any direct link between Pakistan and the bombing, the Afghan government has been more than forthright sharing its belief that Pakistan, specifically their ISI intelligence arm, was behind the attack. The rumor mill is awash with tales of varying veracity but one thing is certain. The possibility of success in Afghanistan is directly hinged on a working relationship between its two tenuous neighbors: India and Pakistan.

The lack of news from Afghanistan - a $4 billion G8 pledge for Afghani security and development was pushed to the back page this week - reflects a worrying sense of idleness and complacency. The situation in Afghanistan is growing worse by the day and requires delicate maneuvering by its neighbors to prevent any further decline.

The relationship between India and Pakistan is shaky at best. Foreign pressure and nuclear co-habitation are the two main reasons they still talk and flare-ups, such as the recent protests in Kashmir, are still common, though violence is at an all-time low. But if there is to be success in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India must restrain their public voices and defuse the situation using diplomatic back channels. Their relationship is too perilous to permit unfounded nationalist rhetoric.

Regional stability is at risk but Afghanistan also needs all the help it can get - especially from two such powerful players. The country's development and freedom requires the military cooperation of Pakistan and the economic support and guidance of India. Without these two pillars, peace may never take hold. The bombing represents many things but not a personal attack on India; the Taliban agents carrying out such work are not Pakistani but Chechnians, Uzbeks, and Arabs. Their fight is a global one. India must realize this and work with Pakistan to stamp out such extremism in Afghanistan. The US must help.

It is unwise and unfair for the US to openly criticize the tribal negotiations. Though more jihadis are now in the FATA, this reflects a perceived chance of success in Afghanistan and one of defeat in Iraq. In this case, correlation is not causation. The negotiations may not be to the US' liking but after supporting an autocratic ruler like Musharraf for so long we must be willing to back a democratically elected government, regardless of whether we like their actions. If Karzai can maintain his grasp on Afghanistan and Pakistan can bring quiet to the FATA, even through devolution of power, then the billions of development dollars pouring into both countries may be put to some use. Without security, and at least the semblance of due political process, extremists will continue to prevent any advancement or peace. NATO forces are already planning their withdrawal: shouldn't they at least leave the Afghans a chance of success?