What is happening in Central Asia?

Pakistan is so bad that we're highlighting trash pick-up and the former American ambassador may soon be effectively governing Afghanistan.

Mr. Holbrooke has his work cut out for him...

South Asia double down

I've been slow to write about the events in India for a variety of reasons, but now that (some of) the dust has settled, it seems appropriate to offer a few thoughts. India (especially Mumbai) is a country I love and have spent a lot of time in and I am loathe to think that the US is dragging its feet in response. 

In the midst of condemnations and travel plans, people seem to be forgetting that these are two nuclear powers in a strategically critical part of the world. What the US does is vital to the future security and stability of South Asia. Though their methods may not have been perfect, our present administration has done a wonderful job of simultaneously maintaining good (well, decent) relations with Pakistan and India.  India is, and should be, one of our strongest allies, even if we have to offer some concessions (non-prolifi what?) and Pakistan continues to be vital to our efforts in Afghanistan. The danger of wrong, or even worse - no, action in this scenario may hasten the loss of two of our most important allies.

The US needs to stamp out any speculation that the ISI (Pakistan's intelligence agency) was involved: even if they were, the notion will simply weaken Pakistan's young, struggling civilian government. The simple truth is that we can't afford to lose support from either of these countries and that will require the type of diplomatic nuance the Bush administration widely lacks. Secretary Rice must send a strong message that any military movement or action will be closely watched, roundly condemned, and will result in lost concessions, whether in trade, arms, or technology. Cooperative investigation is the best, and hardest, path to restoring some semblance of normality.

Take notice W: we can't wait until January 20th for any type of resolution. US memory is short and a deft handling of this situation may alleviate much of the disdain the foreign policy community holds for you.

(Photo: EC)

Who to believe?

Depending on who you believe, the Taliban and Afghan government are either in, or preparing for, negotiations sponsored by Saudi Arabia. President Karzai has admitted that negotiations are forthcoming, Taliban officials either set conditions or deny them, and rumors are circulating in policy circles that Pakistan has been speaking with the Saudis for at least a few months in an effort to secure their involvement.

Given the way information comes out of Afghanistan, it is likely that the Saudis are increasing their involvement in some way; but no clear picture has yet emerged on what these talks are meant to achieve. Supposedly "moderate" elements of the Taliban have split from Al-Qaeda and are interested in entering into the political arena. But without real consensus within the Taliban, can any agreement be trusted? Do we have any other choice with seemingly all our allies calling our efforts futile and useless?

I've said for a while that regional consensus and negotiation is necessary for any type of Afghan stability. Any form of coalition government is a bit scary given the Taliban's track record. The best scenario such a peace deal would yield involves peacekeepers, long-term border forces, and a weakened (and nonviolent form) of the Taliban as a minor opposition group to centrist political parties fashioned in Karzai's model. The likelihood of this is obviously slim so what we need before any more "talks" is a defined end goal and confirmation whether all actors would be willing to accept a less than ideal result in exchange for hopeful stability.

Tread carefully

Human Rights Watch reported today that civilian deaths in Afghanistan tripled from 2006 to 2007. The main culprit? US and NATO air strikes. Unfortunately this is a trend that has continued unabated in 2008. These developments are more than "regrettable" but spell serious trouble for military efforts in the region.

As strikes continue to kill more and more civilians, the US is fast losing support, not only from the Afghan and Pakistani public, but also the governments of both countries. The recent death of 90 civilians - confirmed by the UN - has led to increasingly tough rhetoric from President Karzai and the recent border crossing strikes in Pakistan are leading Zardari, soon to be President of Pakistan, to step up criticism of US and NATO efforts.

Unless the US is careful and starts heeding the very warranted criticisms of both Presidents, then we will soon find ourselves lacking allies and support in the region. Using targeted strikes instead of increasing troop levels is the right move; I've noted this before. But our forces must take great care to verify intelligence before bombing these frontier areas. Any semblance of success hinges on cooperation and support from the independent tribes that inhabit the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This vital section of the populace will not stand for many more civilian deaths...nor should they. As politicians continue to gather support by distancing themselves from American efforts, this administration must realize that our focus should be winning the hearts and minds of the populace. Small, focused special forces groups are the right approach to purging this area of radicalism. While air strikes by drones may decrease the risk to our troops they lack the capability to define civilians and assess information gathered on the ground. Increased intelligence will win this war but don't expect civilians to offer much help if we keep killing their families.

(AP Photo)

The rise of nation building

Ok, last post Afghanistan or Pakistan for a while. Promise.

Today, I had the pleasure of meeting James Dobbins. He was former special envoy to Afghanistan and spoke at the New America Foundation about the lessons he learned while engineering the Bonn Agreement, which established the Afghan government following the US invasion and was a foundation for their new Constitution. His discussion leant itself toward more technical aspects of political development and nation building but allow me to summarize two of his more interesting points regarding the current situation in South Asia.

The Pakistani government regards the current conflict in FATA as a problem between the US and extremists NOT as a problem between Pakistan and extremist militants.

I have said something to this effect before. A large part of this sentiment stems from Pakistan's longstanding support of separatist rebels in Kashmir. The country has a history of harboring extremist groups that may benefit Pakistan at some point (and the Taliban serves to counter Indian influence in Afghanistan).

The current icy relations with Iran are a result of misguided confidence in Iraq.

This sounds controversial. Conventional knowledge says Iran has been adversarial since Khomeini came to power. Not true. Iran has played an instrumental role in the reconstruction (and financial support) of Afghanistan and wanted to be heavily involved in development efforts. By shunning Iranian attempts to aid in reconstruction (when they were willing to capitulate to a host of US demands), the Bush administration seriously miscalculated their position. Seeing quick "success" in Afghanistan and hoping for the same after a quick military takeover of Iraq, Rumsfeld's belief was that once surrounded by two functioning democracies, built from the ground up by the US and allies, Iran would be forced to meet ALL US demands. Well I don't need to remind you that's not quite how events unfolded.

These were two of the more interesting and provoking stances Dobbins took but the entire event is worth checking out.

Going, going, gone

Despite my obvious interest in Pakistan, I did not want to write about Musharraf's resignation until I had some time to really think about the implications. There has been plenty of commentary, most of which is missing the point.

Musharraf was an army man at heart who eschewed democracy for iron fisted control of the military and intelligence communities. His biggest accomplishment was holding onto power for this long. Just after that was his ability to hoodwink the US into believing he was the man who could lead the region into stability. 

History will wait to judge Musharraf until Pakistan's position in the geopolitical realm is resolved. If Pakistan remains stable and is able to control extremism (it will never be fully stamped out), he will be praised for his military prowess and vision in aligning Pakistan with the US. If Pakistan slides deeper into decline and becomes a lawless frontier, then he will be blamed for not doing enough and leaving the civilian government with its hands tied. The truth is that, as much as people call for the coalition to stay strong, they will continue to quibble over the problematic domestic issues that hang over the country (judges, inflation, and violence).

Matthew Yglesias almost gets it right. The US needs a Pakistan policy that is not based on a "new Musharraf" or other figurehead; but this is simply not possible. Pakistani politics, like the Indian variety, are based on cults of personality. Until Pakistani political discourse becomes rooted in policy and not people, the US has little chance of influencing the country's course. The only possibility of guiding Pakistan to a more stable economy and democracy is to divert money from the military to development schemes. If we can build private enterprise and political participation, perhaps the people of Pakistan will demand more from a better leader. Unfortunately, the rudder remains up for now.

Addendum

Relevant updates on my most recent postings:

News has come in from Zimbabwe that Mugabe is planning on forming the next government with or without Tsvangirai. No surprise here really. A more potent force than Mbeki was needed to guide these talks if they were to arrive at any real compromise.

Pakistani news outlets are reporting that Musharraf has agreed, in principle, to step down and possibly leave the country. This may be seen as a step in the right direction, but unless the government exerts its new found strength and imposes civilian rule on the military and intelligence communities then the end result will be an even greater power vacuum than presently exists...and that, my friends, is a scary thought.

(Hat tip: FP Passport)

Pakistan's rudderless course

Anonymous sources within the Indian government have finally come out and said what everyone in the international community is thinking: it is "negotiating with an elected Pakistani government that has little influence over the country’s more powerful army and spy agency."

It is true and it is scary. Much the same way generals will control Zimbabwe regardless of the political agreement there, the democratically elected government of Pakistan lacks the strength to control the country.

Even scarier than the thought of Pakistani hardliners destablizing the entire region (while in control of a nuclear bomb, no less) is that the government's actions suggest they do not care that they are not really in control. They are more than happy to build political capital and rake in the benefits.

Instead of tackling rampant inflation, securing their border, or quelling Kashmiri dissent, Yousaf Raza Gilani (with many others) has worked for the impeachment of Musharraf. Given the historical tension between the two parties in control, it is really no surprise that this is all they can agree on. But given the leadership void and seemingly "rudderless" path Pakistan is following, it would be nice to see the government take needed action. I just hope it does not come to the other choice.

Musharraf's last stand

I've talked about the importance of Pakistan a few times, especially concerning South Asian regional stability. The latest development there revolves around President Musharraf who is refusing to resign, despite impending impeachment charges.

The charges stem for a number of "offenses", varying in their legal strength. Despite his economic mismanagement and authoritarian streak, the only charge with merit concerns his dismissal of a number of judges, including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

The next week will prove vital for Pakistan's democratic development and US strategic interests. Pakistan has had trouble embracing the democratic process and its history is littered with coups, some successful, others not. You can be sure that a lot of licit and illicit diplomatic maneuvering is occurring right now and will continue throughout the hearings. Pakistan is too strategically important to allow for any period of serious instability or confusion.

What the international community is hoping for, and should be working toward, is one of two things. Either a swift conviction of Musharraf, followed by his exile and the decoupling of the military from government hands to independent military men, preferably sympathetic to US training and presence OR Musharraf's acquittal where after he becomes a shadow controller of his loyalist party. I may be vilified for saying this but it is the most attractive option if the first does not happen, which, Pakistan being Pakistan, it will not.

While Musharraf was a "dictator" he kept Pakistan free of the extremism that has spread since he lost central power. While he certainly overstepped his bounds by attempting to strong arm the judiciary, if he worked behind the scenes and effectively kept Pakistan on the path to liberalization this would be vastly preferable to a democratically elected (but still corrupt) government lacking the strength and control to stabilize Pakistan.

Foreign policy is often about picking the best of the worst. And right now, unless Pakistan's government steps up, that pick will be Musharraf.

Pakistani doubletalk

I've discussed the importance and role of Pakistan in South Asia before. Now CIA officials are taking a hard line with the ISI (Pakistan's intelligence agency) regarding their involvement with militant groups. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has denied the supposed links.

The ISI ran arms to the Mujaheddin and other Afghans fighting against the Soviets. Back then it was with CIA backing, but Pakistan retains a vested interest in being seen as an ally of whatever group grabs power in Afghanistan. The new coalition government wants to see democracy thrive in Afghanistan. It would promote peace and stability within Pakistan and increase their international standing. But their porous border in the FATA region prevents any such events. The ISI could certainly, with CIA help, close this border, or at least tighten it. But there are factions of the ISI that are more than happy to assist the Taliban in their various nefarious activities, and take a nice cut off the top. In addition to this, the military men running the ISI are hedging their bets by supporting both sides of the power struggle in Afghanistan. They are stuck in an outdated mindset and hoping for an Afghan ally, regardless of who is in power, to counter the perceived threat from India.

I've said it before and I'll say it again. The stability of Afghanistan and the entire region is hinged on a working relationship between Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. The US is right to force the ISI's hand and demand a legitimate and appropriate response. But military and intelligence aspects must be tempered by transparent, civil structures. We should be encouraging, and diplomatically maneuvering for, civilian control of the ISI. Counter-terrorism requires a civilian, not military, response. We should help Pakistan in developing just that.

Talibanistan?

Pakistan is quickly becoming home to more foreign terrorists than ever before. This is not helped by the truce being cut between the government and tribal groups from the northwestern FATA region. Baitullah Mehsud, a warlord widely suspected of plotting Benazir Bhutto's assassination, is leading the charge. The deal comes fresh on the heels of a suicide bomb attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul that killed 41 civilians and injured 139.

While the US demurly denies any direct link between Pakistan and the bombing, the Afghan government has been more than forthright sharing its belief that Pakistan, specifically their ISI intelligence arm, was behind the attack. The rumor mill is awash with tales of varying veracity but one thing is certain. The possibility of success in Afghanistan is directly hinged on a working relationship between its two tenuous neighbors: India and Pakistan.

The lack of news from Afghanistan - a $4 billion G8 pledge for Afghani security and development was pushed to the back page this week - reflects a worrying sense of idleness and complacency. The situation in Afghanistan is growing worse by the day and requires delicate maneuvering by its neighbors to prevent any further decline.

The relationship between India and Pakistan is shaky at best. Foreign pressure and nuclear co-habitation are the two main reasons they still talk and flare-ups, such as the recent protests in Kashmir, are still common, though violence is at an all-time low. But if there is to be success in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India must restrain their public voices and defuse the situation using diplomatic back channels. Their relationship is too perilous to permit unfounded nationalist rhetoric.

Regional stability is at risk but Afghanistan also needs all the help it can get - especially from two such powerful players. The country's development and freedom requires the military cooperation of Pakistan and the economic support and guidance of India. Without these two pillars, peace may never take hold. The bombing represents many things but not a personal attack on India; the Taliban agents carrying out such work are not Pakistani but Chechnians, Uzbeks, and Arabs. Their fight is a global one. India must realize this and work with Pakistan to stamp out such extremism in Afghanistan. The US must help.

It is unwise and unfair for the US to openly criticize the tribal negotiations. Though more jihadis are now in the FATA, this reflects a perceived chance of success in Afghanistan and one of defeat in Iraq. In this case, correlation is not causation. The negotiations may not be to the US' liking but after supporting an autocratic ruler like Musharraf for so long we must be willing to back a democratically elected government, regardless of whether we like their actions. If Karzai can maintain his grasp on Afghanistan and Pakistan can bring quiet to the FATA, even through devolution of power, then the billions of development dollars pouring into both countries may be put to some use. Without security, and at least the semblance of due political process, extremists will continue to prevent any advancement or peace. NATO forces are already planning their withdrawal: shouldn't they at least leave the Afghans a chance of success?