Russian military capacity

During the Russian-Georgian War this summer, I noted that military analysts the world over would be watching carefully at how Russia fared in its first conventional conflict since Afghanistan. In an article in last week’s Economist, the verdict is in: Russia didn’t do too hot. I strongly encourage you to read the entire thing, but here are the best bits:

· Russian military communications equipment was so dysfunctional in Georgia that the army resorted to using mobile phones to coordinate positions. I can’t help but wonder if they had to pay roaming charges.

· Despite all of the bellicose rhetoric about naval buildup and the imminent construction of 5 or 6 new aircraft carriers, Russia doesn’t even have a naval port with the capacity to build them.

· Although Russian defense spending has doubled in the past 4 or 5 years, massive and systemic corruption ensures that about a third of the funds are wasted.

· In a notable reversal of Cold War geopolitical calculus, Russia now relies on its nuclear deterrent to offset the West’s overwhelming advantages in conventional military combat. It used to be the exact opposite.

While it’s important to acknowledge Russia’s newly aggressive behavior, one should not conflate the willingness to use force with the capacity to use force. Russia remains a threat to its immediate neighbors, but, joint military exercises aside, the country has an incredibly limited capacity to project hard power further than that. In short: Russia is powerful, but that power is constrained by realities (an economy based on resource extraction, corruption, weak institutions) that will make it difficult to sustain.

(Photo from Oleg Zdorik’s photostream)